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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the theory that veto players constrain executives and create a 
more stable political environment.  This study extends previous research by looking at 
two new cases, the empires of China and Japan. I focus on the unconstrained rule of 
Chinese Emperors compared to their Japanese counterparts in part because of the 
existence of a developed feudal society in Medieval Japan, but also because China 
represents one of the earliest forms of meritocratic recruitment for higher offices in the 
government.  Using data on imperial rule, this thesis analyzes the constraining effect of 
feudal institutions in a context found outside typical literature.  I show that constraining 
the executive this way decreases the probability of being removed from office in both 
cases, yet has an ambiguous effect on duration of rule once time trends are taken into 
account.  Unexpectedly, the effect of other institutions—namely merit-based—increased 
the duration of rule for Chinese Emperors. In times when bureaucrats were recruited 
solely based on merit, Chinese emperors ruled for a longer duration of time and enjoyed a 
decreased probability of being removed from office.  I conclude by theorizing that the 
merit system created an independent power base that insulated the bureaucracy from 
executive reprisal, yet still created a powerful centralized state apparatus that undermined 
feudal elites.            
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION: A THEORY OF CONSTRAINT 
 
 Recent scholarship has explored the connection between feudal institutions and 
the divergence in political stability between Western Europe and the Middle East, in part 
as an attempt to explain why the Western world developed growth enhancing institutions 
whereas the Middle East did not1.  In this thesis I endeavor to extend this analysis to 
alternative cases in an attempt to explain political stability—or lack thereof—as a result 
of two types of institutions. If the feudal institutions were the causal mechanisms for 
stability, a higher duration of rule should be observed in other cases that had feudal 
institutions.   
This thesis also explores alternative institutions unique to the cases used to test 
feudal constraint theory and their potential role in constraining the executive.  Merit 
based institutions could have increased the constraint a ruler felt when making unilateral 
decisions because they establish rules of conduct; yet they also create unity of “mission, 
culture, and leadership education” that undermine the constraining effect of feudal 
institutions2.  Institutions that structure hierarchies by merit based on educational 
standards increase the capacity of the ruler to exert his or her rule unilaterally, but they 
also set up the standards in which they are deemed “unfit” to rule.   
                                                 
1 Blaydes and Chaney 2012, specifically compare longevity of rule between European leaders and leaders 
of the Middle East.  Ruler duration was similar between these two societies until 1100 CE when there is a 
divergence.  Blaydes and Chaney argue it is due to the constraints that feudal institutions created for the 
executive.  European leaders' longevity increased relative to leaders of the Middle East after 1100 CE until 
the end of their data set 1500 CE. 
2 DiCicco 2003 
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Using data on imperial rule in Ancient China (1045 BCE to 1912 CE and 
Medieval Japan (40 BCE to 1868 CE), I show that constraint—by feudal or 
unexpectedly, merit institutions—increases political stability and lowers the probability 
of executives being removed from office prematurely.  This conclusion may provide a 
useful insight for scholars looking into the origins of various political systems, especially 
theories that include some notion of path dependency.  By understanding the constraining 
effect of particular institutions, scholars may find some insight to the formation of 
polities that exist today3. 
This study is organized as follows.  The next chapter is a discussion of veto 
players, constraints, and how feudal and merit based institutions constrain executives 
differently and the expectations of longevity of each.  More specifically, the section 
develops the standards in which “constraint” is measured in the rest of the study.  Chapter 
3 is a case study of Japan that focuses on historical analysis to measure constraint 
emperors experienced in different time periods.  Chapter 4 repeats the process of the third 
section, except for the Chinese case.  The fifth chapter takes the independent variable 
measurements established in the previous two chapters and conducts empirical tests to 
determine if constraint extends longevity for rulers.  The last chapter concludes with a 
summary of findings and some direction for future research into this topic.   
 
                                                 
3 This discussion is not new.  Authors speaking on the determinants of democracy frequently cite the 
constraint that European leaders faced compared to other polities where such constraint did not exist. This 
thesis merely extends this analysis to other cases in the hope that future scholarship may explore the topic 
further.  
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CHAPTER 2 
HOW INSTITUTIONS CONSTRAIN 
Veto Players Theory 
 In order to delve into the constraining effect of feudal institutions, it is necessary 
to first explain the logic of veto players theory.  Once the logic is explained I will apply it 
to discuss how feudal institutions constrain and merit institutions fail to constrain.  Veto 
players theory describes how easy or difficult it is for a political system to change.  Veto 
players in a political system are those who have the ability to decline or prevent action 
taken by another actor.  In essence veto players have the ability to reject a deviation from 
the status-quo.  In a system with many veto players there are more opportunities to block 
a proposed change.  The difficulty of creating change increases with the number of veto 
players.  In addition, the ideological disposition of the veto players can reduce or increase 
the problem of collective action.  If veto players agree on a deviation from the status-quo, 
it is likely that the change could be pushed through compared to a system where the veto 
players have widely divergent ideological dispositions or preferences for policy.   Thus 
policy stability is predicted to be the highest in systems with many veto players who have 
large ideological differences between one another.  In these systems incremental change 
is much more likely to occur than rapid action.   
Feudal Institutions 
While the above made the connection between the numbers of veto players 
combined with their ideological disposition to the likelihood of rapid policy change, I 
have yet to establish the link between policy stability and rule stability in the context of 
feudalism.  Blaydes and Chaney make the connection with two pathways.  First, by 
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definition the existence of effective veto players in a political system allows those players 
to have a voice in the game. Veto players have the ability to communicate grievances to 
the ruler and may in fact force the ruler to act upon them.  This method of communicating 
grievances increases the chances that a sovereign may address problems that could build 
up to reasons for revolt or reasons for forcible removal of the sovereign, each reducing 
the length of the average rulers’ reign.  Second, the relatively equal standing of rulers and 
elites makes the preference for removal or revolt lower because the benefits gained by 
taking the ruler’s place is lower.   
 If veto players constrain and constraint increases the longevity of a ruler’s reign, 
how did feudal institutions in Europe reflect these effects?  To answer, it is important to 
note the origins and characteristics of what scholars consider feudalism.  The fall of the 
Western Roman Empire took with it a vast military and civic bureaucratic system that 
once ruled and managed Europe.  The polities and rulers that took its place had fewer 
economic and military resources at their disposal.  Instead, kings relied on economic and 
military support from nobles who in return enjoyed a virtual monopoly of influence over 
a piece of land in return for said support.  Feudal Europe was then organized like a 
pyramid, with the king at the top, nobility in the middle, and the peasantry on the very 
bottom.  This hierarchical system implies that the king was the supreme ruler of the 
polity, but while the king was relatively more powerful than any single noble, he relied 
on and was heavily constrained by the nobility in general.  The invention of the stirrup 
dramatically altered warfare, making heavily armored cavalry the leading technology.  
Armor and cavalry was expensive and would have put an incredible economic strain on 
the king if a standing army was created.  Instead, nobles, who could afford the technology 
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for themselves acted when called upon by the king—if they were so inclined.  In return 
for the land, nobles would serve in the military of the king (or later could purchase their 
way out of their duty).  This created a privileged class of warriors and a lower class that 
was used for economic—mostly agricultural—production4.   
 To measure the constraining effect of feudalism, standards that indicate constraint 
need to be established.  First, the constraining effect outlined in Blaydes and Chaney 
(2012), defines a ruler who lacks a monopoly on force in their own polity is constrained.  
Disputes among elites and rulers could escalate to warfare and by sharing the coercive 
means of the state with the nobility, the ruler faced internal rivals and subsequently 
powerful veto players.  Second, the estate system (bound by hereditary succession) found 
in Europe constrained the executive by increasing the independent power base of nobles 
relative to the king.  Smaller farms, looking for protection of powerful nobles, 
consolidated under one estate.  These estates gradually created a significant check on the 
king’s economic position.  Third, the lack of a well-developed bureaucracy that the 
sovereign can use to extract resources from the land, to raise and manage a central army, 
and in general to manage a society is also an indication of a constrained rule.  Thus, I 
measure constraint under feudal institutions when:  there exists a powerful warrior class 
semi-independent from the ruler, a powerful landed aristocracy under a variant of the 
estate system whose power was determined by birth and inheritance, and a lack of fiscal 
capacity because a lack of a well-developed bureaucracy.  I thus expect in times where 
these constraints are present there is an increased length of rule for sovereigns because of 
powerful veto players and a reduced payoff for removal of the sovereign.          
                                                 
4Oppenheimer 1945 
6 
 
 
Merit Based Institutions 
While feudal institutions constrained executives, rulers were not without methods 
for resisting this effect.  The existence of feudal arrangements implies a powerful 
aristocracy—militarily and economically—that could constrain the executive by having 
feudal lords staff the bulk of positions in a feudal bureaucracy.  Merit-based systems—
particularly civil-service examinations—reduce the influence of hereditary succession 
because they introduce an alternative standard which qualifies potential bureaucrats for 
governmental and political service.  Instead of land and title being the determinant of a 
power base it is now based on knowledge or skill measurable by the exam.  Under such a 
system, knowledge of a certain subject would establish position for political elites rather 
than an individual having economic or military resources independent of the state.  
However, it should be noted that the more economic influence an individual possessed, 
the greater the access to materials—teachers, books, etc.—one could use to increase 
performance on the exam.  Under a civil-service examination system the effect of the 
resources is lessened and is not the sole determinant of political influence, but cannot be 
completely disentangled from political influence.  The key characteristic of the institution 
is then the change in determinant of influence from military, economic, and hereditary 
resources to that of just merit—usually in the form of knowledge.       
The effects of merit based institutions on constraint for the executive can be more 
challenging to tease out than feudal institutions.  Meritocracy establishes state sponsored 
standards for rule that each player must have in order to have a voice in governance.  This 
seems to imply a constraining effect, where each individual veto player (including the 
king) is constrained by the standards deemed acceptable in the system.  This creates a less 
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personalistic method of rule and the office, rather than the person, is now the defining 
characteristic of the potential veto player.  Another way of thinking of this effect, is the 
constraining effect of the particular ideology that is the standard for “merit”.  
Specifically, civil-service exams reward performance based on a certain ideology.  This 
ideology can be constraining or unconstraining depending on the context.  In this study's 
case, Chinese ideology in the examination system rewarded Legalist and Confucian 
ideals, which focused on a powerful, yet virtuous ruler5.   
Merit based institutions can also create more capable bureaucrats for a specific 
mission or vision of governance6.  If the leader is on board with that vision and acts in 
accordance with it (like Confucian ideals), the ruler is less constrained than if the 
meritocratic system was not in place because potential elites are all on the same 
ideological page.  In addition, removing aristocratic heritage as the sole determinant of 
political authority would decrease the voice of aristocratic elites in issues of governance7.  
By definition the elites’ reduced influence on the system lessens the constraint the 
executive experiences.  The latter logic seems to be more convincing, due to the 
decreased ideological distance between veto players and the reduction in the number of 
potential veto players (removing the political influence of the landed elite).  This would 
imply less policy stability where the sovereign could be punished for poor outcomes, 
even with ideological similarity with the ruler.   
                                                 
5For example, the emperors of the Qing dynasty sometimes restrained themselves in order to enable a 
coercive method of moral indignation instead of the use of violence.  See Metzger 1973.  In contrast, it 
could be argued that contemporary ideology (particularly of the West) consists of restrained, decentralized 
authority that is made legitimate based on checks and balances. 
6DiCicco 2003 
7Miyazaki 1976 and Kracke 1947 
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In addition, by reducing the political influence of the landed elite, merit-based 
systems also reduce pathways to articulate grievances.  If elites lack the ability to 
communicate grievances, there is a diminished probability that the sovereign will stumble 
upon a solution that addresses the specific problem.  With grievances uncommunicated, 
elite action against the sovereign may occur, potentially reducing the length of rule if the 
political system’s inability to address grievances outweighs the benefits of political 
stability.   I propose that merit based systems eliminated constraints on officeholders but 
also created the standards by which rule was judged.   Thus I expect shorter duration of 
rule for times when meritocracy is firmly in place as it lessens the real constraint on 
authority, but establishes standards by which punishment of the ruler—removal or 
otherwise—is legitimate. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONSTRAINTS IN MEDIEVAL JAPAN 
 
Having described veto players theory, how feudal and merit based institutions can 
constrain, and the expectations associated with each, it is now time to show how feudal 
and merit institutions existed within Japan.  As stated previously, feudal institutions—
defined as a system where military and economic resources determine political influence 
and where the central ruler does not have a monopoly on both—existed within both 
cases.  In fact, this study proposes that the constraining effect of these institutions can be 
measured dichotomously given limited historical data8.  This chapter and the next is 
broken down by case and time.  A chronological account of institutions and measurement 
of constraint during time periods is constructed.    
Feudal Institutions in Japan 
The Yamato period (40 BCE to 700 CE) signifies the beginning of a semi-unified 
Japanese state.  Compared to the imperial state of the 7th through the 12th centuries CE, 
the Yamato period consisted of a decentralized political system of clans and weak 
adherence to a “royal” Yamato house.  While members of the Yamato clan were 
considered the supreme Japanese rulers and dispensed land and title, in reality most of the 
clans were regional hegemons and enjoyed independent power bases9.  Regions were 
under aristocratic control that was inherited.  The Yamato did not enjoy a monopoly of 
                                                 
8 A continuous measure of “constraint” is imaginable, but the creation of standards for a continuous 
measurement is beyond the scope of this paper.  Categories of “high”, “intermediate”, and “low” can be 
easier to devise within the cases and since my two cases are similar in many respects, are likely comparable 
between cases as well.  
9Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2010 
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the coercive nor productive means of the state, implying a fairly constrained rule.  This 
began to change when Japan entered the Nara Period.   
Faced with the threat of the strong imperial dynasty of the Tang in China, Japan 
began to undertake reforms that dramatically altered the distribution of power within 
Japan.  Elites who would have otherwise resisted these reforms were faced with the 
reality that the “state” army under Yamato was insufficient to deal with the Tang army.  
The Taika Reforms under Emperor Tenji created the imperial state and put the coercive 
means of the state solely in the hands of the emperor.  Universal conscription replaced a 
semi-feudal system of elites lending soldiers to the Yamato, which undermined the 
aristocratic elites’ ability to be veto players.  The large standing army was created to deal 
with the Chinese but also disgruntled former chieftains under the newly centralized (and 
unconstraining) system.  However, the Chinese invasion never came and some of the 
reforms began to give way to more feudal arrangements once more.  The expensive 
standing army was reorganized into smaller units, whose main purpose was to police the 
state, fighting small bands of criminals rather than organized armies. 
With the reduction of standing armies also came imperial outsourcing of the 
military.  Elites now employed small bands rather than a military under the direct 
command of the state. These small bands eventually became the infamous system of 
samurai, private soldiers who were loyal to feudal lords rather than the state itself10.  In 
addition, peasants began to consolidate influence to protect themselves against raiders 
and criminals.  Farmers traded their labor and agricultural production for protection of 
local lords, creating an independent economic base that was immune to state taxation11.   
                                                 
10Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2010 
11Oppenheimer 1947 
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At the same time, elites competed amongst themselves for political influence.  
Various levels of elites fought with each other and tried gaining allegiances of lower 
elites.  Provincial governors—the main mechanisms of central control over the land—
were not immune to this infighting and members of the aristocracy proved to be 
important allies.  Posts became entrenched within certain families.  Certain clans had a 
monopoly on military posts and other clans had monopolies over civil appointments.  In 
addition, former office holders moved from the capital to the countryside, forming 
influential estates12.   
The foundations of feudal arrangements began to solidify when the rivalry 
between the Minamoto and Taira escalated into full blown war.  In the provinces the 
Minamoto conquered martial law was declared, and created a divide in the country:  
those under the direct political control of the Minamoto and those under the control of the 
Imperial Court.  Yorimoto of the Minamoto clan eventually won and gained legal 
recognition of the martial powers he had amassed, formally creating the Kamakura 
Shogunate. 
From 1185-1300 CE, the Shogun and the Emperor shared influence in the 
country.  It wasn’t until a failed attempt to remove the Shogunate system that the power 
sharing system broke down and gradually all political influence was absorbed into the 
office of the Shogun and away from the Emperor.  Under the Shogunate system the 
Shogun ruled supreme, but was also propped up by regional warlords called daimyo13, 
very similar to the role the aristocracy played in Europe.  The Emperor was in theory the 
                                                 
12Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2010 
13The previous influential aristocratic class, the kuge, gave way to the bushi—samurai—who were 
organized around the Diaymo lords. 
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ruler of Japan, but for all practical matters was ultimately so constrained that decision 
making influence was severely compromised.  This system lasted until 1868 when the 
feudal systems began to break down and Emperor Loyalists rose to remove the Shogun 
leading to the Meiji Restoration.   
This history provides context where a measurement of constraint can be devised.  
Emperors in the Yamato period were constrained by aristocratic chieftains because 
Emperors lacked the full coercive and economic means of the state.  Thus rule under the 
Yamato was constrained compared to the time period that came after.  The Nara and 
Heian periods were relatively unconstrained for the Emperor.  They attempted 
centralization reforms, some of which were reorganized after the threat of the Chinese 
crumbled.  However, the aristocracy’s political authority was significantly reduced 
relative to the Emperor.  Thus the Emperor during this time was unconstrained.  It wasn’t 
until feudal arrangements began to solidify that the Emperor was once again constrained, 
first by the power sharing of the 1200s and then ultimately by the Shogunate system, 
where the Emperor was the ruler of Japan in name only.  This implies a period of 
constraint for the Emperor that extends until the end of the dataset used in this study.  
Thus periods of constraint included the Yamato and the Shogunate, whereas the periods 
of unconstraint were the Nara and Heian.  If constraint and stability do have a 
relationship, I expect ruler duration to be highest under the Shogunate system and lowest 
in the Nara and Heian periods. 
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Table 1. Timeline of Japan.  
Year  Event 
40 BCE Yamato period begins with Jimmu (traditional founder of ruling dynasty) 
  Yamato period associated with decentralized rule 
  Yamato period military based on kinship and clan relations 
  Weak adherence to royal house 
Taika Reforms undertaken to centralize authority in response to Chinese 
threat 
700 CE Nara period begins  
  Ritsuryo military system 
 Literary works such as Kojiki and Nihon Shoki written to empower rule of 
Emperors 
  Japan's capital moved to Heijo-kyo and is modeled after Chinese capital. 
  Conscription based armies disbanded in most provinces 
794 CE Heian period begins.   
  Ties to countryside become stronger rather than weaker 
  Provincial governors' level of private expropriation becomes a problem 
  Court nobles begin to emigrate from capital to countryside  
  Aristocratic (kugyo) alliances with provincial officials (zuryo) 
Mid-Heian private militaries formed, yet under "state" banner until the 
1300s 
  Leader of Minamoto supports clumsy attempt to remove Emperor 
  Office of the cloistered Emperor" In-no-cho formed (1086-1116) 
1185 CE Taira and Minamoto clash, Minamoto no Yoritomo seize power 
establishing shogunate in Kamakura 
  Emergence of Samurai as a social and political class 
  Establishment of "feudalism" in Japan 
  Imperial court maintains power in the East 
 Jokyu War between Cloistered Emperor Go-Toba and Hojo Yoshitoki, 
imperial court under the Shogunate 
 Emperor Go-Daigo pushed claim to throne.  Rebellion in 1331. Ashikaga 
Takuji turned against Kamakura.  Hojo defeated. 
1336 CE Northern Court installed by Ashikaga, establish new line of Shogun. 
  Took over imperial remnants 
  Strong regional rulers formed:  the Daimyo 
  Shoguns weakened after Yoshimitsu 
  Onin War breaks out  
1573 CE Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Leyasu 
  Many regional daimyo that consolidate over time 
  Hierarchy:  Shinpan, Fudai, Tozama 
1868 CE Boshin war restores Emperor and eliminates office of the Shogun 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONSTRAINTS IN ANICENT CHINA 
 
 China has a long historical record.  The data considered in this paper ranges from 
1045 BCE to 1911 CE.  During this time executive constraint due to institutions has 
varied significantly.  The political system of the Zhou dynasty (1045 to 256 BCE) had a 
central authority ruling over semiautonomous states.  This system was akin to the first 
among equals system of the Yamato Period for Japan.  The king of the Zhou ruled over a 
feudal system that had similar institutions to that of Europe14.  Military and economic 
power was decentralized, where regional hereditary leaders were the norm15.  Political 
relationships were hierarchical, with aristocratic and patronage connections creating 
power in the system.  Even though the “son of heaven”16 had the only state authority to 
form armies, lords paid no attention17.  The military was organized around powerful 
nobles (Zhouli or “feudal lords”)18, particularly those who could afford chariots (Shi) 
which were technologically advanced for the time.  The land tenure system was a 
manorial economy and mostly relied on slave labor.  Each of these implies a parallel to 
European feudal arrangements.  The system began to breakdown when the power 
dynamics between the central authority (Zhou) and the elites (Zhouli) shifted 
dramatically.  The Zhou stopped expanding, while the states in the periphery continued to 
expand, consolidate resources, and create organizational structures that supported better 
                                                 
14Fu 1971 
15Zhou 2011, Raaflaub and Rosenstein 1999 
16Ropp 2010, The title of King Wu of the Zhou which was adopted by Chinese Emperors afterwards.  It 
references the “mandate of heaven” (tianming) or the “right to rule”, of which was used by the Zhou to 
justify removing the previous dynasty, the Shang, from power. 
17Raaflaub and Rosenstein 1999 
18Higham and Graff 2012 
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militaries19.  The disparity in power eventually led to conflict and China entered into a 
period of warfare until the Qin unified the empire under their banners.  The Qin was a 
former vassal of the Zhou on the periphery of the empire.  Its “backwardness” by Zhou 
standards prevented the rise of a powerful aristocracy that could block Qin rulers20.  The 
Qin organized their military on the basis of peasantry conscription rather than reliance on 
noble lords.  They also shifted from reliance on the chariot to infantry and cavalry.  The 
highly organized standing armies of the Qin overcame former vassals and the Zhou alike.     
 The Qin dynasty (221 to 207 BCE) is considered one of the “earliest totalitarian 
superpowers in world history”21.  In many ways the Qin was responsible for creating and 
popularizing institutions that unified China.  One of the first acts of the unified empire 
was to disarm all of the other states’ militaries, eliminating organized military resistance 
to the Qin’s authority.  It was this time when “legalism” (Fajia)—a philosophical system 
that promotes the state over the individual—took hold of China22.  Ancient authors’ 
writings on it indicate that the economy “must be geared to the consolidation of the 
state”.  Qin legalists also believed that people should only be rewarded based on 
performance—particularly only in the military and the production of agricultural goods—
and were harshly punished for the slightest violation of the law to curtail crime23.   Land 
was semi-privatized to undermine the independent power base of the aristocracy that had 
existed under the Zhou.  Peasants were assigned land and were taxed at a low rate to 
                                                 
19Hui 2005 
20Higham and Graff 2012 
21Kulmar 2014 and Dreyer 2012, also to note is Confucian values which legitimizes the use of force for a 
state, yet highlights the importance of a virtuous ruler to be the example that the population can emulate. 
22Kulmar 2014 
23Higham and Graff 2012, specifically Shang Yang of the Qin abolished hereditary status and created new 
titles of nobility (jue) for such success. 
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encourage spending24.   However, the Qin did not last long as constant strife at court and 
the harsh penalties for violating the law led to mass riots25.  The Qin dynasty was built for 
war and once its external enemies were all defeated, domestic problems plagued the Qin.  
Advisers staged a coup d’état in 207 BCE and the Qin dynasty was no more.  However, 
the Han dynasty (207 BCE to 189 CE)—succeeding the Qin—quickly dashed the hopes 
of the aristocracy by maintaining many of the institutions the Qin established.  While the 
first Han Emperor lessened the harsh penalties that the legalism of the Qin promoted 
(partially because of the belief it incited the riots that ousted the Qin), the state was still 
seen as the most important part of Chinese life.  The feudal institutions under the Zhou 
were effectively destroyed by the Qin and never returned. 
 The Han dynasty followed the Qin's military system as well.  Peasant based 
conscription was the linchpin of that system.  Conscripts served within their native 
province (jun) and the governor was the martial commander in the case of invasion.  It 
was also during the Han that the use of eunuchs in palace affairs became popular.  
Eunuchs were seen as a means of curbing elite influence because they could not produce 
children and thus could not accumulate wealth26.  However, they did amass influence and 
subverted the political system at various times in Han history.  With the rise of the 
eunuchs also came the decision to reduce the prominence of the peasant conscription 
system.  Professional and voluntary armies took its place.  These armies created personal 
ties to generals and military commanders rather than the Han court.  When the Yellow 
                                                 
24Ropp 2010 
25Ropp 2010 
26Ropp 2010, as well as ensuring that members of the royal house were truly legitimate. 
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Turbans, a religious revolt, plunged the capital into chaos, Han generals on the periphery 
declared independence and the dynasty became victim to civil war. 
 Three dynasties eventually formed out of the chaos:  the Wei, Shu Han, and Wu.  
Eventually the Northern Wei Dynasty formed, which is of particular note because 
Empress Feng devised the equal field system which established all land as property of the 
state.  The state assigned a set amount of land and resources to families.  In return 
families paid taxes on their production.  Only families with ties to officials could own 
more than the allotment.  It was designed to ensure all available land was occupied by tax 
payers and no one single family could accumulate wealth that rivaled the royal family27.  
This system survived the fall of the destruction of the Northern Wei and subsequent 
dynasties adopted the policy.  The Sui, Song, Tang, Yuan, Ming, and Qing each tried 
implementing policies to increase the authority of the emperor and to limit aristocratic 
influence on the system in an attempt to prevent the removal of the “Mandate of 
Heaven”28.  One such policy that transformed Chinese society was the civil-service 
examination system.      
 China is one of the earliest examples of introducing a merit based civil-service 
examination system.  Exams have their foundations in the Han, but were considered the 
only pathway to higher office in the Tang dynasty.  The examination system was a way to 
recruit the best and brightest to operate within the state apparatus, but it was mostly “a 
way for the emperor to rule most effectively”29.  The civil-service system taught and 
                                                 
27Ropp 2010 
28Ropp 2010, for example the Tang implemented the “Rule of Avoidance”, a policy that forbade officials to 
serve the districts they were born in.   
29Miyazaki 1976 
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tested knowledge of the classics30, whereas math and science were left to other sections 
of society.  Analysis of the effects of the merit system focus on who eventually attained 
office and while the system did bring new blood into governance, candidates of elite 
background did fare better than those who did not have those connections31.  The civil-
service exam was an experiment in standardizing education and created strong 
socialization effects that resulted in “unity of culture, mission, and leadership 
education”32. 
 Given the variation in feudal and merit arrangements in China’s history, there is 
sufficient evidence to determine levels of constraint on the executive.  Based on the 
Zhou’s feudal arrangements—powerful elites and potential veto players to the first 
among equals king—the Zhou dynasty seems to be a system of constrained rule, whereas 
the Qin and subsequent dynasties were far more unconstrained in rule.  The aristocracy 
did regain some influence post-Qin, yet the system never went back to feudal 
arrangements even though they did contemplate it in various dynasties—especially the 
Southern Sung33.   
When considering the civil-service examination and how it increased the ability 
of the ruler to extend authority and influence34, periods where the exam did not exist 
imply a relatively constrained executive.  The Tang dynasty established the civil-service 
                                                 
30Most of the literature they were tested over emphasized Confucian values.  The importance of a virtuous 
yet strong leader was a common theme. 
31Kracke 1947 
32DiCicco 2003 
33Song 2011 
34There is an issue of reverse causality to consider.  It could be that the civil examination system was 
devised to limit the authority of unconstrained emperors.  I cannot fully discount this explanation, but 
historical scholars have established the connection between origins of the system and an attempt to increase 
the capability of state capacity.  A more capable state is likely to project the Emperor's power rather than 
limit it. 
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exam as the only means of acquiring office in the bureaucracy; this indicates an easy 
breakpoint for lack of constraint.  It should be noted that with successful invasion of 
China by the Mongols, the examination system was disbanded from 1307-1320 CE, and 
this period is coded as “constrained”.  If constraint and rule longevity are indeed related, I 
then expect the Zhou period to be associated with the longest rule, the Qin the least, and 
post-Qin between the two.  In addition, when the examination system was the only means 
of recruitment into the bureaucracy I suspect that ruler longevity was compromised.  The 
next section establishes the research method I will use to test these expectations. 
  
20 
 
 
Table 2. Timeline for China. 
Year  Event 
1045 BCE Zhou rule China 
  Feudal lords (Zhouli) rule semiautonomous states 
  In the state of Qin legalist reforms take place.   
  Legalism is an ideology based on increasing authority of the ruler 
 Qin adopts conscription based armies, removes hereditary status, semi-
privatization of land 
A former vassal sacks the Zhou capital; states begin to fight one another 
for prominence 
221 BCE Qin unifies China 
  Harsh legalist doctrine creates unrest 
  Aristocracy’s role in government is severely diminished 
207 BCE Coup de tat, replaced by the Han 
  Han dynasty lessens the harsh penalties for violating the law 
  Maintains many of the other institutions created by the Qin 
Later down the Han dynasty creates professional armies rather than 
conscription 
  Military commanders on the periphery gain loyalty of their soldiers 
186 CE Yellow Turban revolt, military commanders declare independence, civil 
war ensues 
220 CE Three Kingdoms period:  Wei, Shu Han, Wu 
265 CE Jin Dynasty 
420 CE Northern and Southern Dynasties 
589 CE Sui Dynasty 
618 CE  Tang Dynasty 
  Imperial examinations set up to reduce influence of aristocracy 
  Equal Field System 
  Fubing military system 
907 CE Tang collapses as rebellions ripped the country apart resulting in Five 
Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period 
960 CE Song dynasty founded, conflict with Jin and Western Xia Dynasties 
  Song capital captured by the Jin, Southern Song forms 
1227 CE Western Xia falls to the Mongols 
1234 CE Jin falls to the Mongols 
1279 CE Southern Song Dynasty destroyed by the Mongols 
1279 CE Yuan Dynasty forms.  Kublai Khan adopts Chinese customs.  
  Assigned families to small specific military units 
1368 CE Yuan dynasty falls and is replaced by Ming Dynasty 
1644 CE Qing replaces Ming 
1911 CE Last imperial dynasty falls 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
 
The research design of this paper is rather simple.  First, historical evidence was 
gathered to determine if feudal or merit based institutions were present in each case.  
Second, an analysis of the constraining effect of each institution was conducted to create 
the independent variable.  Third, constraint was coded to reflect two levels of variation 
within and across the two cases of China and Japan.  Fourth, data on ruler longevity and 
the probability of being deposed was gathered using Dynasties of the World written by 
John E. Morby (2002).  Morby lists rulers, beginning and end dates of their reign, and 
provides information if the ruler was removed from office.  It is a source used by 
previous articles on the subject and is the main source for this study's dependent 
variables35.  The Morby dataset is corrected in order to reflect the existence of 
“Cloistered Emperors” or retired emperors who were the de facto rulers of Japan.  I use 
the longevity of these cloistered emperors and disregard emperors who held nominal 
authority.  Boxplots of ruler duration by dynasty can be found in Figures 5-8.  Finally, 
models were constructed to reflect the relationship between constraint, ruler duration, and 
the probability of being deposed.     
The methodology of this paper utilizes ordinary least squares regression and 
logistic regression.  The OLS regression is used to estimate ruler duration based on the 
level of constraint and the logit regression is used to estimate the probability of being 
deposed given the level of constraint an executive experienced.  The first model is 
                                                 
35Blaydes and Chaney 2012 
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estimated using data on Japanese rulers whereas the second model is estimate using data 
on Chinese rulers.  I include a time variable represented by the start year of the reign of 
the emperor.  I also include time squared and time cubed to pick up on other patterns.  
These time controls are included in the models to control for time trends like 
technological advances that increase longevity of life and thus rule for rulers.  Each of 
these models use the two level and three level measurements of constraint.  Using two-
level variation data, constraint is a dummy variable (coded 1 for constraint, 0 for 
unconstraint).   
A discussion of the distribution of the data is needed in order to determine if p-
values can adequately detect statistical significance. For both China and Japan, ruler 
duration is significantly skewed to the right.  Given that the data is skewed to the right, I 
take the log base ten of duration of rule plus one.  Figure 3 and 4 show the new 
distribution of the data.  I estimate regressions based on the transformed variable.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of Rule Longevity 
in Japan. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Rule Longevity 
in China. 
 
 
Figure 3. Transformed Ruler Duration 
for Japan. 
 
Figure 4. Transformed Ruler Duration 
for China. 
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Figure 5. Boxplots of Ruler Duration by 
Dynasty. 
 
Figure 6. Boxplots of Ruler Duration by 
Dynasty (Continued). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Boxplots of Duration of Rule. 
 
Figure 8. Boxplots of Duration of Rule 
for Emperors (Continued). 
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Results 
 Below, Table 3 includes the results of the OLS regressions explained in the 
previous section.  It shows the coefficient estimates for each variable in each model as 
well as including the models with time controls.  Note that the coefficients are estimated 
off the transformed duration variable.  Constraint for Japan is not statistically significant 
with and without the time controls.  The sign is positive in the model without time 
controls, but it becomes negative when time controls are added.  Constraint is significant 
in the model without time controls and a constrained ruler could expect to rule for a year 
longer if constrained.  When time controls are added to the China model, the constraint 
variable once again loses significance, but still has a positive coefficient. Once again 
without the time controls, the combined model has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for constraint.  A constrained rule could be expected to rule for .64 years 
longer than an unconstrained ruler.  Since the time controls seem to absorb much of the 
effect of constraint, there may be other trends in time that are increasing rule in times that 
I have deemed constrained for rulers. 
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Table 3. Predicting Duration of Rule based on Feudal Constraint. 
 Without Time Controls With Time Controls 
 Japan China Combine Japan China Combine 
Intercept 1.07*** 
(.062) 
.934*** 
(.029) 
.993*** 
(.057) 
1.80*** 
(.190) 
1.16*** 
(.301) 
1.50*** 
(.217) 
Constraint .104 
(.073) 
.302*** 
(.080) 
.216*** 
(.057) 
-.083 
(.081) 
.165 
(.190) 
.0265 
(.0822) 
State  -- -- -.048 
(.057) 
-- -- -.187* 
(.754) 
Time -- -- -- -1.80** 
(.062) 
-.222 
(.518) 
-.244 
(.345) 
Time Squared -- -- -- 1.30* 
(.707) 
-.0429 
(.326) 
-.121 
(.243) 
Time Cubed -- -- -- -.23 
(2.4) 
.045 
(.068) 
-.067 
(.053) 
Observations 121 283 404 121 283 404 
Note:  *p ≤ .10, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01; standard errors in parentheses; time controls are 
rescaled for presentation, time is multiplied by 10^3, time squared by 10^6, and time 
cubed by 10^9. 
 
 Another way to examine my theory empirically is through the probability of being 
removed from office.  I theorized in Chapter # that political stability declines because of 
elite action against the sovereign.  Thus I expect that constrained rulers would also have a 
decreased probability of being removed from office than those whose rule was 
unconstrained.  OLS estimates of models predicting deposed can be found in Table #.  
Constraint is significant in the Japan, China, and Combined models without time 
controls, each having a negative coefficient.  Statistical significance drops when time 
controls are added to the China model, but Japan and the combined models still retain 
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significance.  Overall this provides evidence for my theory:  constraint decreases the odds 
of being removed from office.   
 Table 4. Predicting Removal of Office using OLS Regression 
 Without Time Controls With Time Controls 
 Japan China Combine Japan China Combine 
Intercept .64 
(.07) 
.24*** 
(.026) 
.578* 
(.34) 
.26 
(.21) 
.059 
(.27) 
.81*** 
(.21) 
Constraint -.5*** 
(.08) 
-.21** 
(.072) 
-2.3*** 
(.42) 
-.32*** 
(.092) 
-.099 
(.17) 
-.346*** 
(.080) 
State  -- -- -1.75*** 
(.365) 
-- -- -.30*** 
(.073) 
Time*1000 -- -- -- -1.3 
(7.0) 
2.0 
(4.7) 
.76* 
(.33) 
Time 
Squared*10^6 
-- -- -- 1.1  
(.8) 
-.03  
(.3) 
.58*  
(.23) 
Time Cubed*10^9 -- -- -- -.58* 
(.27) 
-.01 
(.06) 
-.13* 
(.051) 
Observations 121 283 404 121 283 404 
Note:  *p ≤ .10, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01; standard errors in parentheses; time controls are 
rescaled for presentation, time is multiplied by 10^3, time squared by 10^6, and time 
cubed by 10^9. 
 
Given that the popular method to predict a dichotomous variable is a logistic 
regression, it is important to run the models using this method as well.    I provide the 
results of the logistic regression that predicts the probability of being deposed by using 
information regarding constraint in Table 4.  Constraint has a negative sign across all 
models and is statistically significant in three of them which supports my expectations.   
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Table 5. Predicting Probability of Being Deposed based on Feudal Constraint. 
 Without Time Controls With Time Controls 
 Japan China Combine Japan36 China Combine 
Intercept .48  
(.35) 
-1.2*** 
(.15) 
.58*  
(.34) 
-56.6** 
(25.4) 
-5.9 
(4.2) 
-.373 
(2.1) 
Constraint -2.14***  
(.46) 
-2.39** 
(1.03) 
-2.3*** 
(.42) 
1.35 
(1.04) 
-.33 
(1.8) 
-1.8*** 
(.48) 
State  -- -- -1.75*** 
(.365) 
-- -- -1.4*** 
(.40) 
Time*1000 -- -- -- 142** 
(68.6) 
7.6 
(7.3) 
-1.6 
(3.6) 
Time Squared*10^6 -- -- -- -10.11* 
(5.93) 
-3.7  
(4.1) 
2.2  
(2.2) 
Time Cubed*10^9 -- -- -- 26 
 (16.4) 
-.55 
(7.5) 
-.6 
(.45) 
Observations 121 283 404 121 283 404 
Note:  *p ≤ .10, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01; standard errors in parentheses; time controls are 
rescaled for presentation, time is multiplied by 10^3, time squared by 10^6, and time 
cubed by 10^9. 
 
Since the coefficients are difficult to interpret directly, I provide predictions on 
the probability of removal for each emperor in Figures #-#. Figure # provides the 
probabilities for Japanese Emperors. Emperors faced lower probability of being removed 
from office in the Yamato period and increased over time until it peaks at .80 in the 
middle of the Heian Period.  After that it decreases until it reaches Yamato period levels 
under the Shogunate.  This trend in the data matches my expectations with regards to 
                                                 
36 There is an issue of fitted probabilities numerically 0 or 1 in the Japan model with time controls.  I still 
report the logit coefficients, but this result should be met with some skepticism. 
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constraint and stability.  The Yamato and Shogunate periods constrained the office of the 
Emperor and is associated with lower probabilities of being removed from office.  This 
provides evidence that supports the theory outlined in Chapter 2.  However, China seems 
to be a different story.  
 
Figure 9. Probability of being removed in Japan, with Time Controls. 
 
Figure # provides information on China.  Rulers of the Zhou period start out at a 
low probability of being removed from office, which is what I expected. However, the 
probability eventually decreases.   The probability jumps to around .15 during the Qin 
Dynasty. It increases over time until peaking at .25 during the Sui Dynasty.  It then 
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decreases until the end of the dataset.  I expected that post Qin would be associated with 
increased probability of removal and ruler duration, yet the probability declines post-Sui.  
Interestingly enough this is around the time that merit based institutions began to take 
shape in Ancient China. 
 
Figure 10. Probability of being Removed in China, with Time Controls  
 
 Table 5 provides the results of using a merit indicator in place of constraint for 
data from Ancient China.  I include both the OLS estimates predicting duration and 
removal, with and without time controls. Merit is positive in both duration models and 
negative in the removal model with time controls, yet only the merit variable in the 
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duration model with time controls is statistically significant.  Contrary to the theory I 
built in Chapter 2, merit based civil-service examination system is actually associated 
with higher duration of rule and decreased probability of being removed from power.  I 
had believed that a civil-service examination system would decrease the constraint the 
Emperor felt because of the reduction in ideological distance between elites.  This 
evidence supports that merit based institutions may have constrained rather than 
eliminate the constraints on the executive. 
Table 6. Predicting Duration of Rule and Probability of Removal Based on Merit. 
 Without Time Controls With Time Controls 
 Duration Removal Duration Removal 
Intercept .942*** 
(.037) 
.210*** 
(.033) 
1.26*** 
(.146) 
-.025 
(.134) 
Merit .068 
(.055) 
.0024 
(.049) 
.309** 
(.105) 
-.138 
(.096) 
Time*1000  -- -- .998 
(4.32) 
1.1 
(3.96) 
Time Squared*10^6 -- -- -47.9 
(34.6) 
144.0 
(317.) 
Time Cubed*10^9 -- -- .14* 
(.074) 
-.05 
(.068) 
Observations 283 283 283 283 
Note:  *p ≤ .10, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01; standard errors in parentheses; time 
controls are rescaled for presentation, time is multiplied by 10^3, time 
squared by 10^6, and time cubed by 10^9. 
 
Figure 11 provides a graphical representation of the probability of being removed 
based on logit estimators.  The probability of being removed increases until again around 
the Sui and decreases significantly under the Tang.  The probability decreases further 
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until the end of the dataset.  This provides some evidence that merit based institutions 
decreased the probability of removal and may have constrained the executive in some 
capacity. 
 
Figure 11. Probability of Being Removed from Office, Merit Constraint 
 
Shoguns 
 There may be a possibility that the theory only applies to the de facto rulers, 
rather than nominal rulers.  I would argue that nominal rulers are still pertinent to the 
theory because they represent leaders who are supremely constrained, but I still think it is 
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important to rerun models with data on the de facto rulers to see if there are similar 
results.  In the following models I first use data on the Hojo regency which forced 
shoguns and emperors alike into a nominal role until the Ashikaga shogunate, where the 
shoguns reestablished their authority.  I measure constraint for these de facto rulers 
unconstrained until the Ashikaga shogunate where shogunate constables acquired 
significant power to constrain the ruler.  These new constables were referred to as the 
daimyo.  Table 7 provides OLS estimates for ruler duration and deposal.  In the models 
without time controls, the sign of the coefficient for constraint meets expectations.  In the 
duration model it is positive and statistically significant at the .10 level, although this is 
not enough significance for a one-way test.  In the removal model the coefficient is 
negative and is statistically significant.  When you introduce time controls, the constraint 
variable loses all statistical significance in the duration model and the sign changes to 
negative, yet the constraint variable in the removal model retains its sign and statistical 
significance.  This provides marginal support for the theory, mostly because of the 
removal models.  
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Table 7. OLS Estimates for de facto rulers.  
 Without Time Controls With Time Controls 
 Duration Removal Duration Removal 
Intercept .997*** 
(.058) 
.58*** 
(.063) 
1.65*** 
(.22) 
.26 
(.24) 
Constraint .13* 
(.076) 
-.37*** 
(.082) 
-.0049 
(.103) 
-.34*** 
(.11) 
Time  -- -- -1.4* 
(.7) 
.44 
(.76) 
Time Squared -- -- .91 
(.82) 
-.19 
(.90) 
Time Cubed -- -- -.18 
(.29) 
.056 
(.032) 
Observations 124 124 124 124 
Note:  *p ≤ .10, **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01; standard errors in parentheses; time 
controls are rescaled for presentation, time is multiplied by 10^3, time 
squared by 10^6, and time cubed by 10^9. 
 
 Using logistic estimators for the probability of being removed from office there is 
again some evidence that supports the theory.  Figure 12 provides a graphical 
representation of the probability of being removed from office for rulers over time.  
Probability starts out low for emperors in the Yamato period and slowly increases until it 
peaks for emperors in the Heian period.  It then decreases over time and significantly 
decreases under the Ashikaga.  The probability begins to increase again during the 
Tokugawa shogunate.  This is somewhat unexpected, but could be due to the rising 
tension between elites who favored the emperor and the Tokugawa who were trying to 
retain power.  In fact, the last few Tokugawa shoguns were removed from office at an 
exceedingly rapid rate, to which the probabilities reflect.  The Tokugawa shogunate did 
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oversee some of the efforts toward modernity for Japan and began to set the foundations 
for more traditional state structures37.  This could represent some change in constraint 
that I may be missing in the model.   
 
Figure 12. Probability of Being Removed from Office Using De Facto Data. 
  
                                                 
37 Osamu 1982 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis has endeavored to clarify the theoretical arguments surrounding feudal 
constraints and political stability while also formulating a theory that can be used to 
explain merit-based institution’s effects on constraint.  Chapter 2 explored this endeavor 
in detail, but in summary I theorized that feudal institutions created veto players to block 
dramatic policy change.  This opened up channels of communication between elites and 
executives while also decreasing the potential benefits of removing the sovereign.  These 
connections result in increased duration of rule which is a proxy measure for political 
stability.  I also explored merit-based institutions and theorized that these institutions 
would eliminate the constraints on the executive because knowledge-based merit systems 
would decrease the ideological distance between each veto player, yet I did note that the 
standard may be utilized as an independent power source that can be used to counter 
executive action.     
 Based on my theory, I expected in times where feudal institutions were present 
that duration of rule would increase and probability of being removed from office would 
decrease.  However, the results indicate that while the probability of being removed from 
office did decrease, the results were ambiguous for duration of rule.  Many of the time 
controls decreased the statistical significance of feudal constraint, yet signs were 
frequently in the expected, positive direction.  Unexpectedly, in times when the 
bureaucracy was filled with merit-based appointments rather than feudal, duration of rule 
was higher and the probability of being removed from office was decreased.  I had 
37 
 
 
theorized that such a system would eliminate the constraints on the executive due to 
decreasing the ideological distance between veto players and also undermining hereditary 
status of feudal bureaucrats.  Results do not support this theory, so there is a question of 
how a civil-service system could constrain the executive.  The answer may be found in 
literature based on data from modern times. 
Recruitment and selection of civil servants is stated to be one of the most 
important facets to modern bureaucracy and merit systems are frequently used to curtail 
the nepotism that exists in many developing countries.38  Looking at bureaucratic change, 
reform preferences of current officeholders depend upon the chances of retaining the 
office in the next election.  When current officeholders expect to win in the next election, 
they politicize the bureaucracy and when they fear they will lose, they try to insulate it 
from the political process39.  In this manner, merit-based systems may actually be created 
and shaped in a manner that builds an independent power base rather than built purely as 
a tool for the executive to exert their authority.  The emperor may not have decided to 
insulate the bureaucracy from his will, but could have attempted to secure a lasting 
legacy by preventing successors from dramatically altering state policy.  In effect, the 
aging emperor may have been a veto player to imperial successors. 
There are a few problems with this thesis that leaves more room for future 
scholarship.  I do not consider the outside constraints rulers frequently faced.  Outside 
pressure from China forced Japanese rulers to undertake centralization efforts and 
nomadic invasions may have created institutions of limited constraint in China.  
However, outside threat may also have affected the dependent variables of this study.  
                                                 
38 Moon and Hwang 2013 
39 Ting et al. 2012 
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The theory proposed here predicts rule would be shortened due to internal elites, but 
outside constraint may also cut short a ruler’s reign by means of conquest.  This study 
only marginally considers how outside pressures and thus outside constraint on the 
executive could have affected a sovereign’s rule.  In addition, there may be a geographic 
component of this theory that is unmentioned here.  The distance between the core and 
the periphery may be important for constraint because the ruler may struggle to extend 
influence across long geographical distances, but at the same time potential veto players 
in the periphery may have a harder time overcoming collective action problems to block 
central actions.  Unfortunately, geographic control variables for the time period and cases 
considered have been difficult to locate. 
Nevertheless, this thesis has provided evidence that supports other literature 
which concludes that constraining the executive increases political stability and decreases 
the probability of being removed.  It also provides an analysis of early meritocracy in 
China and provides evidence the civil-service examinations systems constraint rather than 
unconstrain the rule of leaders.  While China today is still a far cry from becoming a 
democracy and Japan’s technocratic form of democracy is highly centralized, feudal 
constraints affected their predecessors in similar ways to that of the developed 
democracies of the West, albeit potentially in different magnitude. Understanding the 
origins of constraint on the executive is a meaningful endeavor as it could provide more 
nuance to the determinants of political systems that persist today. 
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APPENDIX:  DATA 
Table 8. Combined Dataset. 
Sovereign State Dynasty Constraint Start Date 
End 
Date Duration Merit Deposed 
Wu China Western Zhou Yes -1045 -1043 2 No No 
Cheng China Western Zhou Yes -1043 -1006 37 No No 
Kang China Western Zhou Yes -1003 -978 25 No No 
Chao China Western Zhou Yes -978 -957 21 No No 
Mu China Western Zhou Yes -957 -918 39 No No 
Kung China Western Zhou Yes -918 -900 18 No No 
I China Western Zhou Yes -900 -873 27 No No 
Hsiao China Western Zhou Yes -873 -866 7 No No 
Yi China Western Zhou Yes -866 -858 8 No No 
Li China Western Zhou Yes -858 -841 17 No No 
Gonghe 
Regency China Western Zhou Yes -841 -828 13 No Yes 
Hsuan China Western Zhou Yes -828 -782 46 No No 
Yu China Western Zhou Yes -782 -771 11 No No 
P'ing China Eastern Zhou Yes -771 -720 51 No No 
Huan China Eastern Zhou Yes -720 -697 23 No No 
Chuang China Eastern Zhou Yes -697 -682 15 No No 
His China Eastern Zhou Yes -682 -677 5 No No 
Hui China Eastern Zhou Yes -677 -652 25 No No 
Hsiang China Eastern Zhou Yes -652 -619 33 No No 
Ch'ing China Eastern Zhou Yes -619 -613 6 No No 
Kuang China Eastern Zhou Yes -613 -607 6 No No 
Ting China Eastern Zhou Yes -607 -586 21 No No 
Chien China Eastern Zhou Yes -586 -572 14 No No 
Ling China Eastern Zhou Yes -572 -545 27 No No 
Ching China Eastern Zhou Yes -545 -520 25 No No 
Tao China Eastern Zhou Yes -520 -520 0 No No 
Ching China Eastern Zhou Yes -520 -476 44 No No 
Yuan China Eastern Zhou Yes -476 -469 7 No No 
Chen-Ting China Eastern Zhou Yes -469 -441 28 No No 
Kao China Eastern Zhou Yes -441 -426 15 No No 
Wei-leih China Eastern Zhou Yes -426 -402 24 No No 
An  China Eastern Zhou Yes -402 -376 26 No No 
Lieh China Eastern Zhou Yes -376 -369 7 No No 
Hsien  China Eastern Zhou Yes -369 -321 48 No No 
Shên-ching 
(son) China Eastern Zhou Yes -321 -315 6 No No 
Nan China Eastern Zhou Yes -315 -256 59 No No 
Shih Huang Ti China Qin No -221 -210 11 No No 
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Êrh Shih Huang 
Ti China Qin No -210 -207 3 No No 
Ch'in Wang China Qin No -207 -206 1 No No 
Kao Ti China Western Han No -207 -195 12 No No 
Hui Ti China Western Han No -195 -188 7 No No 
Lü Hou China Western Han No -188 -180 8 No No 
Wen Ti China Western Han No -180 -157 23 No No 
Ching Ti China Western Han No -157 -141 16 No No 
Wu Ti China Western Han No -141 -87 54 No No 
Chao Ti China Western Han No -87 -74 13 No No 
Hsuan Ti China Western Han No -74 -48 26 No No 
Yuan Ti China Western Han No -48 -33 15 No No 
Ch'eng Ti China Western Han No -33 -7 26 No No 
Ai Ti China Western Han No -7 1 8 No No 
Ping Ti China Western Han No 1 6 5 No No 
Ju-tzu Ying China Western Han No 6 9 3 No Yes 
Chai Huang Ti China Hsin No 9 23 14 No No 
Huai-yang 
Wang China Hsin No 23 25 2 No Yes 
Kuang Wu Ti China Eastern Han No 25 57 32 No No 
Ming Ti China Eastern Han No 57 75 18 No No 
Chang Ti China Eastern Han No 75 88 13 No No 
Ho Ti China Eastern Han No 88 106 18 No No 
Shang Ti China Eastern Han No 106 106 0 No No 
An Ti China Eastern Han No 106 125 19 No No 
Shun Ti China Eastern Han No 125 144 19 No No 
Ch'ung Ti China Eastern Han No 144 145 1 No No 
Chih Ti China Eastern Han No 145 146 1 No No 
Huan Ti China Eastern Han No 146 168 22 No No 
Ling Ti China Eastern Han No 168 189 21 No No 
Shao Ti China Eastern Han No 189 189 0 No Yes 
Hsien Ti China Eastern Han No 189 220 31 No Yes 
Wen Ti China Wei Dynasty No 220 226 6 No No 
Ming Ti China Wei Dynasty No 226 239 13 No No 
Fei Ti China Wei Dynasty No 239 254 15 No Yes 
Shao Ti China Wei Dynasty No 254 260 6 No No 
Yuan Ti China Wei Dynasty No 260 266 6 No Yes 
Chao Lieh Ti China Minor Han No 221 223 2 No No 
Hou Chu China Minor Han No 223 263 40 No Yes 
Ta Ti China Wu No 222 252 30 No No 
Fei Ti China Wu No 252 258 6 No Yes 
Ching Ti China Wu No 258 264 6 No No 
Mo Ti China Wu No 264 280 16 No Yes 
Wu Ti China Western Chin No 266 290 24 No No 
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Hui Ti China Western Chin No 290 307 17 No No 
Huai Ti China Western Chin No 307 311 4 No Yes 
Min Ti China Western Chin No 311 316 5 No Yes 
Yuan Ti China Eastern Chin No 317 323 6 No No 
Ming Ti China Eastern Chin No 323 325 2 No No 
Cheng Ti China Eastern Chin No 325 342 17 No No 
Kang Ti China Eastern Chin No 342 344 2 No No 
Mu Ti China Eastern Chin No 344 361 17 No No 
Ai Ti China Eastern Chin No 361 365 4 No No 
Hai-his Kung China Eastern Chin No 365 372 7 No Yes 
Chien Wen Ti China Eastern Chin No 372 372 0 No No 
Hsiao Wu Ti China Eastern Chin No 372 396 24 No No 
An Ti China Eastern Chin No 396 419 23 No No 
Kung Ti China Eastern Chin No 419 420 1 No Yes 
Wu Ti China Liu Sung  No 420 422 2 No No 
Shao Ti China Liu Sung  No 422 424 2 No No 
Wen Ti China Liu Sung  No 424 453 29 No No 
Hsiao Wu Ti China Liu Sung  No 453 464 11 No No 
Chien Fei Ti China Liu Sung  No 464 466 2 No No 
Ming Ti China Liu Sung  No 466 472 6 No No 
Hou Fei China Liu Sung  No 472 477 5 No No 
Shun Ti China Liu Sung  No 477 479 2 No Yes 
Kao Ti China Southern Chi No 479 482 3 No No 
Wu Ti China Southern Chi No 482 493 11 No No 
Yu-lin Wang China Southern Chi No 493 494 1 No No 
Hai-ling China Southern Chi No 494 494 0 No Yes 
Ming Ti China Southern Chi No 494 498 4 No No 
Tung-hun Hou China Southern Chi No 498 501 3 No No 
Ho Ti China Southern Chi No 501 502 1 No No 
Wu Ti China Liang No 502 549 47 No No 
Chien Wen Ti China Liang No 549 551 2 No No 
Yu-Chang 
Wang China Liang No 551 551 0 No Yes 
Yuan Ti China Liang No 551 555 4 No No 
Ching Ti China Liang No 555 557 2 No Yes 
Wu Ti China Ch'en No 557 559 2 No No 
Wen Ti China Ch'en No 559 566 7 No No 
Lin-hai Wang China Ch'en No 566 568 2 No Yes 
Hsuan Ti China Ch'en No 568 582 14 No No 
Hou Chu China Ch'en No 582 589 7 No Yes 
Tao Wu Ti China Northern Wei No 386 409 23 No No 
Ming Yuan Ti China Northern Wei No 409 423 14 No No 
Tai Wu Ti China Northern Wei No 423 452 29 No No 
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Nan-an Wang China Northern Wei No 452 452 0 No No 
Wen Cheng Ti China Northern Wei No 452 465 13 No No 
Hsien Wen Ti China Northern Wei No 465 471 6 No Yes 
Hsiao Wen Ti China Northern Wei No 471 499 28 No No 
Hsuan Wu Ti China Northern Wei No 499 515 16 No No 
Hsiao Ming Ti China Northern Wei No 515 528 13 No No 
Lin T'ao Wang China Northern Wei No 528 528 0 No No 
Hsiao Chuang 
Ti China Northern Wei No 528 530 2 No Yes 
Tun-hai Wang China Northern Wei No 530 531 1 No Yes 
Chieh Min Ti China Northern Wei No 531 532 1 No No 
An-ting Wang China Northern Wei No 532 532 0 No Yes 
Hsiao Wu Ti China Northern Wei No 532 535 3 No No 
Hsiao Ching Ti China Eastern Wei  No 534 550 16 No Yes 
Wen Hsuan Ti China Northern Ch'i No 550 559 9 No No 
Fei Ti China Northern Ch'i No 559 560 1 No Yes 
Hsiao Chao Ti China Northern Ch'i No 560 561 1 No No 
Wu Ch'eng Ti China Northern Ch'i No 561 565 4 No Yes 
Hou Chu China Northern Ch'i No 565 577 12 No No 
Yu Chu China Northern Ch'i No 577 577 0 No Yes 
Wen Ti China Western Wei No 535 551 16 No No 
Fei Ti China Western Wei No 551 554 3 No No 
Kung Ti China Western Wei No 554 557 3 No No 
Hsiao Min Ti China Northern Zhou No 557 557 0 No No 
Ming Ti China Northern Zhou No 557 560 3 No No 
Wu Ti China Northern Zhou No 560 578 18 No No 
Hsuan Ti China Northern Zhou No 578 579 1 No Yes 
Ching Ti China Northern Zhou No 579 581 2 No Yes 
Wen Ti China Sui  No 581 604 23 No No 
Yang Ti China Sui  No 604 617 13 No Yes 
Kung Ti China Sui  No 617 618 1 No Yes 
Kao Tsu China T'ang No 618 626 8 Yes Yes 
T'ai Tsung China T'ang No 626 649 23 Yes No 
Kao Tsung China T'ang No 649 683 34 Yes No 
Chung Tsung China T'ang No 683 684 1 Yes Yes 
Jui Tsung China T'ang No 684 690 6 Yes Yes 
Wu Hou China T'ang No 690 705 15 Yes Yes 
Chung Tsung China T'ang No 705 710 5 Yes No 
Jui Tsung China T'ang No 710 712 2 Yes Yes 
Hsuan Tsung China T'ang No 712 756 44 Yes Yes 
Su Tsung China T'ang No 756 762 6 Yes No 
Tai Tsung China T'ang No 762 779 17 Yes No 
Te Tsung China T'ang No 779 805 26 Yes No 
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Shun Tsung China T'ang No 805 805 0 Yes Yes 
Hsien Tsung China T'ang No 805 820 15 Yes No 
Mu Tsung China T'ang No 820 824 4 Yes No 
Ching Tsung China T'ang No 824 827 3 Yes No 
Wen Tsung China T'ang No 827 840 13 Yes No 
Wu Tsung China T'ang No 840 846 6 Yes No 
Hsiuan Tsung China T'ang No 846 859 13 Yes No 
I Tsung China T'ang No 859 873 14 Yes No 
His Tsung China T'ang No 873 888 15 Yes No 
Chao Tsung China T'ang No 888 904 16 Yes No 
Ai Ti China T'ang No 904 907 3 Yes Yes 
T'ai Tsu China Later Liang No 907 912 5 Yes No 
Ying Wang China Later Liang No 912 913 1 Yes No 
Mo Ti China Later Liang No 913 923 10 Yes No 
Chuang Tsung China Later T'ang No 923 926 3 Yes No 
Ming Tsung China Later T'ang No 926 933 7 Yes No 
Min Ti China Later T'ang No 933 934 1 Yes No 
Fei Ti China Later T'ang No 934 937 3 Yes No 
Kao Tsu China Later Chin No 937 942 5 Yes No 
Ch'u Ti China Later Chin No 942 947 5 Yes Yes 
Kao Tsu China Later Han No 947 948 1 Yes No 
Yin Ti China Later Han No 948 951 3 Yes No 
T'ai Tsu China Later Zhou No 951 954 3 Yes No 
Shih Tsung China Later Zhou No 954 959 5 Yes No 
Kung Ti China Later Zhou No 959 960 1 Yes Yes 
T'ai Tsu China Liao (Khitan) No 907 926 19 Yes No 
T'ai Tsung China Liao (Khitan) No 926 947 21 Yes No 
Shih Tsung China Liao (Khitan) No 947 951 4 Yes No 
Mu Tsung China Liao (Khitan) No 951 969 18 Yes No 
Ching Tsung China Liao (Khitan) No 969 982 13 Yes No 
Sheng Tsung China Liao (Khitan) No 982 1031 49 Yes No 
Hsing Tsung China Liao (Khitan) No 1031 1055 24 Yes No 
Tao Tsung China Liao (Khitan) No 1055 1101 46 Yes No 
T'ien-tso Ti China Liao (Khitan) No 1101 1125 24 Yes Yes 
T'ai Tsu China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 990 1004 14 Yes No 
T'ai Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1004 1032 28 Yes No 
Ching Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1032 1048 16 Yes No 
I Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1048 1068 20 Yes No 
Hui Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1068 1086 18 Yes No 
Ch'ung Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1086 1139 53 Yes No 
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Jen Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1139 1193 54 Yes No 
Huan Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1193 1206 13 Yes No 
Hsiang Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1206 1211 5 Yes No 
Shen Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1211 1223 12 Yes Yes 
Hsien Tsung China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1223 1226 3 Yes No 
Wei-ming Hsien China 
His 
Hsia/Tangut No 1226 1227 1 Yes Yes 
T'ai Tsu China Chin (Jurchen) No 1115 1123 8 Yes No 
T'ai Tsung China Chin (Jurchen) No 1123 1135 12 Yes No 
His Tsung China Chin (Jurchen) No 1135 1150 15 Yes No 
Hai-ling Wang China Chin (Jurchen) No 1150 1161 11 Yes No 
Shih Tsung China Chin (Jurchen) No 1161 1189 28 Yes No 
Chang Tsung China Chin (Jurchen) No 1189 1208 19 Yes No 
Wei-shao Wang China Chin (Jurchen) No 1208 1213 5 Yes No 
Hsuan Tsung China Chin (Jurchen) No 1213 1224 11 Yes No 
Ai Tsung China Chin (Jurchen) No 1224 1234 10 Yes No 
Mo Ti China Chin (Jurchen) No 1234 1234 0 Yes Yes 
T'ai Tsu China Northern Song No 960 976 16 Yes No 
T'ai Tsung China Northern Song No 976 997 21 Yes No 
Chen Tsung China Northern Song No 997 1022 25 Yes No 
Jen Tsung China Northern Song No 1022 1063 41 Yes No 
Ying Tsung China Northern Song No 1063 1067 4 Yes No 
Shen Tsung China Northern Song No 1067 1085 18 Yes No 
Che Tsung China Northern Song No 1085 1100 15 Yes No 
Hui Tsung China Northern Song No 1100 1126 26 Yes Yes 
Ch'in Tsung China Northern Song No 1126 1127 1 Yes Yes 
Kao Tsung China Southern Song No 1127 1162 35 Yes Yes 
Hsiao Tsung China Southern Song No 1162 1189 27 Yes Yes 
Kuang Tsung China Southern Song No 1189 1194 5 Yes Yes 
Ning Tsung China Southern Song No 1194 1224 30 Yes No 
Li Tsung China Southern Song No 1224 1264 40 Yes No 
Tu Tsung China Southern Song No 1264 1274 10 Yes No 
Kung Ti China Southern Song No 1274 1276 2 Yes Yes 
Tuan Tsung China Southern Song No 1276 1278 2 Yes No 
Ti Ping China Southern Song No 1278 1279 1 Yes Yes 
T'ai Tsu China Yuan/Mongol No 1206 1229 23 Yes No 
T'ai Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1229 1246 17 Yes No 
Ting Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1246 1251 5 Yes No 
Hsien Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1251 1259 8 Yes No 
Shih Tsu China Yuan/Mongol No 1260 1294 34 Yes No 
Ch'eng Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1294 1307 13 Yes No 
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Wu Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1307 1311 4 Yes No 
Jen Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1311 1320 9 Yes No 
Ying Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1320 1323 3 Yes No 
T'ai-ting Ti China Yuan/Mongol No 1323 1328 5 Yes No 
Wen Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1328 1329 1 Yes No 
Ming Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1329 1329 0 Yes No 
Wen Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1329 1332 3 Yes No 
Ning Tsung China Yuan/Mongol No 1332 1332 0 Yes No 
Shun Ti China Yuan/Mongol No 1332 1368 36 Yes Yes 
Hung Wu China Ming No 1368 1398 30 Yes No 
Chien Wen  China Ming No 1398 1402 4 Yes No 
Yung Lo China Ming No 1402 1424 22 Yes No 
Hung His China Ming No 1424 1425 1 Yes No 
Hsuan Te China Ming No 1425 1435 10 Yes No 
Cheng T'ung China Ming No 1435 1449 14 Yes Yes 
Ching T'ai China Ming No 1449 1457 8 Yes Yes 
Tien Shun China Ming No 1457 1464 7 Yes No 
Ch'eng Hua China Ming No 1464 1487 23 Yes No 
Hung Chih China Ming No 1487 1505 18 Yes No 
Cheng Te China Ming No 1505 1521 16 Yes No 
Chia Ching China Ming No 1521 1567 46 Yes No 
Lung Ch'ing China Ming No 1567 1572 5 Yes No 
Wan Li China Ming No 1572 1620 48 Yes No 
T'ai Ch'ang China Ming No 1620 1620 0 Yes No 
T'ien Ch'i China Ming No 1620 1627 7 Yes No 
Ch'ung Chen China Ming No 1627 1644 17 Yes No 
Hung Kuang  China Southern Ming No 1644 1645 1 Yes Yes 
Lung Wu China Southern Ming No 1645 1646 1 Yes No 
Yung Li China Southern Ming No 1646 1662 16 Yes Yes 
T'ien Ming China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1616 1626 10 Yes No 
Ch'ung Te China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1626 1643 17 Yes No 
Shun Chih China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1643 1661 18 Yes No 
K'ang His China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1661 1722 61 Yes No 
Yung Cheng China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1722 1735 13 Yes No 
Ch'ien Lung China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1735 1796 61 Yes Yes 
Chia Ch'ing China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1796 1820 24 Yes No 
Tao Kuang China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1820 1850 30 Yes No 
Hsien Feng China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1850 1861 11 Yes No 
T'ung Chih  China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1861 1875 14 Yes No 
Kuang Hsu China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1875 1908 33 Yes No 
Hsuan Tung China Ch’ing/Manchu No 1908 1912 4 Yes Yes 
Jimmu  Japan Yamato Yes -40 -10 30 No No 
Suizei  Japan Yamato Yes -10 20 30 No No 
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Annei  Japan Yamato Yes 20 50 30 No No 
Itoku  Japan Yamato Yes 50 80 30 No No 
Kōshō Japan Yamato Yes 80 110 30 No No 
Kōan Japan Yamato Yes 110 140 30 No No 
Kōrei Japan Yamato Yes 140 170 30 No No 
Kōgen Japan Yamato Yes 170 200 30 No No 
Kaika  Japan Yamato Yes 200 230 30 No No 
Sujin  Japan Yamato Yes 230 258 28 No No 
Suinin  Japan Yamato Yes 258 290 32 No No 
Keikō Japan Yamato Yes 290 322 32 No No 
Seimu  Japan Yamato Yes 322 355 33 No No 
Chūai Japan Yamato Yes 355 362 7 No No 
Ōjin Japan Yamato Yes 362 394 32 No No 
Nintoku  Japan Yamato Yes 394 427 33 No No 
Richū Japan Yamato Yes 427 432 5 No No 
Henzei  Japan Yamato Yes 432 437 5 No No 
Ingyō Japan Yamato Yes 437 454 17 No No 
Ankō Japan Yamato Yes 454 547 93 No No 
Yūryaku Japan Yamato Yes 547 489 58 No No 
Seinei  Japan Yamato Yes 489 494 5 No No 
Kenzō Japan Yamato Yes 494 497 3 No No 
Ninken  Japan Yamato Yes 497 504 7 No No 
Buretsu  Japan Yamato Yes 504 510 6 No No 
Keitai  Japan Yamato Yes 510 527 17 No No 
Ankan  Japan Yamato Yes 527 535 8 No No 
Senka  Japan Yamato Yes 535 539 4 No No 
Kimmei  Japan Yamato Yes 539 571 32 No No 
Bidatsu  Japan Yamato Yes 571 585 14 No No 
Yōmei Japan Yamato Yes 585 587 2 No No 
Sushun  Japan Yamato Yes 587 592 5 No No 
Suiko  Japan Yamato Yes 592 628 36 No No 
Jomei  Japan Yamato Yes 628 641 13 No No 
Kōgyoku Japan Yamato Yes 641 645 4 No No 
Kōtoku Japan Yamato Yes 645 654 9 No No 
Saimei  Japan Yamato Yes 654 661 7 No No 
Tenji  Japan Yamato Yes 661 672 11 No No 
Kōbun Japan Yamato Yes 672 672 0 No No 
Temmu  Japan Yamato Yes 672 686 14 No No 
Jitō Japan Yamato Yes 686 697 11 No Yes 
Mommu  Japan Yamato Yes 697 707 10 No No 
Gemmei Japan Nara No 707 715 8 No Yes 
Genshō Japan Nara No 715 724 9 No Yes 
Shōmu Japan Nara No 724 749 25 No Yes 
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Kōken Japan Nara No 749 758 9 No Yes 
Junnin  Japan Nara No 758 764 6 No Yes 
Shōtoku Japan Nara No 764 770 6 No No 
Kōnin Japan Nara No 770 781 11 No Yes 
Kammu  Japan Heian  No 781 806 25 No No 
Heizei  Japan Heian  No 806 809 3 No Yes 
Saga  Japan Heian  No 809 823 14 No Yes 
Junna  Japan Heian  No 823 833 10 No Yes 
Nimmyō Japan Heian  No 833 850 17 No No 
Montoku  Japan Heian  No 850 858 8 No No 
Seiwa  Japan Heian  No 858 876 18 No Yes 
Yōzei Japan Heian  No 876 884 8 No Yes 
Kōkō Japan Heian  No 884 887 3 No No 
Uda  Japan Heian  No 887 897 10 No Yes 
Daigo  Japan Heian  No 897 930 33 No Yes 
Suzaku  Japan Heian  No 930 946 16 No Yes 
Murakami  Japan Heian  No 946 967 21 No No 
Reizei  Japan Heian  No 967 969 2 No Yes 
En'yū Japan Heian  No 969 984 15 No Yes 
Kazan  Japan Heian  No 984 986 2 No Yes 
Ichijō Japan Heian  No 986 1011 25 No Yes 
Sanjō Japan Heian  No 1011 1016 5 No Yes 
Go-Ichijō Japan Heian  No 1016 1036 20 No No 
Go-Suzaku  Japan Heian  No 1036 1045 9 No Yes 
Go-Reizei  Japan Heian  No 1045 1068 23 No No 
Go-Sanjō Japan Heian  No 1068 1073 5 No Yes 
Shirakawa  Japan Heian  No 1073 1129 56 No No 
Toba  Japan Heian  No 1107 1156 49 No No 
Go-Shirakawa  Japan Heian  No 1155 1192 37 No No 
Takakura  Japan Heian  No 1180 1181 1 No No 
Antoku  Japan Heian  No 1180 1185 5 No No 
Go-Toba  Japan Kamakura Yes 1183 1221 38 No No 
Tsuchimikado  Japan Kamakura Yes 1198 1210 12 No Yes 
Juntoku  Japan Kamakura Yes 1210 1221 11 No Yes 
Chūkyō Japan Kamakura Yes 1221 1221 0 No Yes 
Go-Horikawa  Japan Kamakura Yes 1221 1232 11 No Yes 
Shijō Japan Kamakura Yes 1232 1242 10 No No 
Go-Saga  Japan Kamakura Yes 1242 1246 4 No Yes 
Go-Fukakusa  Japan Kamakura Yes 1246 1260 14 No Yes 
Kameyama  Japan Kamakura Yes 1260 1274 14 No Yes 
Go-Uda  Japan Kamakura Yes 1274 1287 13 No Yes 
Fushimi  Japan Kamakura Yes 1287 1298 11 No Yes 
Go-Fushimi  Japan Kamakura Yes 1298 1301 3 No Yes 
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Go-Nijō Japan Kamakura Yes 1301 1308 7 No No 
Hanazono  Japan Kamakura Yes 1308 1318 10 No Yes 
Go-Daigo  Japan Southern Court Yes 1318 1339 21 No No 
Go-Murakami  Japan Southern Court Yes 1339 1368 29 No No 
Chōkei Japan Southern Court Yes 1368 1383 15 No Yes 
Go-Kameyama Japan Southern Court Yes 1383 1392 9 No Yes 
Kōgon Japan Northern Court Yes 1331 1333 2 No No 
Kōmyō Japan Northern Court Yes 1333 1348 15 No No 
Sukō Japan Northern Court Yes 1348 1351 3 No No 
Go-Kōgon Japan Northern Court Yes 1351 1371 20 No No 
Go-En'yū Japan Northern Court Yes 1371 1382 11 No No 
Go-Komatsu  Japan Muromachi Yes 1382 1412 30 No No 
Shōkō Japan Muromachi Yes 1412 1428 16 No No 
Go-Hanazono  Japan Muromachi Yes 1428 1464 36 No No 
Go-
Tsuchimikado  Japan Muromachi Yes 1464 1500 36 No No 
Go-
Kashiwabara  Japan Muromachi Yes 1500 1526 26 No No 
Go-Nara  Japan Muromachi Yes 1526 1557 31 No No 
Ōgimachi Japan Muromachi Yes 1557 1586 29 No No 
Go-Yōzei Japan Tokugawa Yes 1586 1611 25 No No 
Go-Mizunoo  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1611 1629 18 No No 
Meishō Japan Tokugawa Yes 1629 1643 14 No No 
Go-Kōmyō Japan Tokugawa Yes 1643 1654 11 No No 
Go-Sai  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1654 1663 9 No No 
Reigen  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1663 1687 24 No No 
Higashiyama  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1687 1709 22 No No 
Nakamikado  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1709 1735 26 No No 
Sakuramachi  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1735 1747 12 No No 
Momozono  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1747 1762 15 No No 
Go-
Sakuramachi  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1762 1771 9 No No 
Go-Momozono  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1771 1779 8 No No 
Kōkaku Japan Tokugawa Yes 1779 1817 38 No No 
Ninkō Japan Tokugawa Yes 1817 1846 29 No No 
Kōmei Japan Tokugawa Yes 1846 1857 11 No No 
Meiji  Japan Tokugawa Yes 1857 1912 55 No No 
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Table 9. Dataset for de Facto Data. 
Sovereign Period Constraint 
Rule 
Start 
Rule 
End Duration Deposed 
Jimmu  Yamato Yes -40 -10 30 No 
Suizei  Yamato Yes -10 20 30 No 
Annei  Yamato Yes 20 50 30 No 
Itoku  Yamato Yes 50 80 30 No 
Kōshō Yamato Yes 80 110 30 No 
Kōan Yamato Yes 110 140 30 No 
Kōrei Yamato Yes 140 170 30 No 
Kōgen Yamato Yes 170 200 30 No 
Kaika  Yamato Yes 200 230 30 No 
Sujin  Yamato Yes 230 258 28 No 
Suinin  Yamato Yes 258 290 32 No 
Keikō Yamato Yes 290 322 32 No 
Seimu  Yamato Yes 322 355 33 No 
Chūai Yamato Yes 355 362 7 No 
Ōjin Yamato Yes 362 394 32 No 
Nintoku  Yamato Yes 394 427 33 No 
Richū Yamato Yes 427 432 5 No 
Henzei  Yamato Yes 432 437 5 No 
Ingyō Yamato Yes 437 454 17 No 
Ankō Yamato Yes 454 547 93 No 
Yūryaku Yamato Yes 547 489 58 No 
Seinei  Yamato Yes 489 494 5 No 
Kenzō Yamato Yes 494 497 3 No 
Ninken  Yamato Yes 497 504 7 No 
Buretsu  Yamato Yes 504 510 6 No 
Keitai  Yamato Yes 510 527 17 No 
Ankan  Yamato Yes 527 535 8 No 
Senka  Yamato Yes 535 539 4 No 
Kimmei  Yamato Yes 539 571 32 No 
Bidatsu  Yamato Yes 571 585 14 No 
Yōmei Yamato Yes 585 587 2 No 
Sushun  Yamato Yes 587 592 5 No 
Suiko  Yamato Yes 592 628 36 No 
Jomei  Yamato Yes 628 641 13 No 
Kōgyoku Yamato Yes 641 645 4 No 
Kōtoku Yamato Yes 645 654 9 No 
Saimei  Yamato Yes 654 661 7 No 
Tenji  Yamato Yes 661 672 11 No 
Kōbun Yamato Yes 672 672 0 No 
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Temmu  Yamato Yes 672 686 14 No 
Jitō Yamato Yes 686 697 11 Yes 
Mommu  Yamato Yes 697 707 10 No 
Gemmei Nara No 707 715 8 Yes 
Genshō Nara No 715 724 9 Yes 
Shōmu Nara No 724 749 25 Yes 
Kōken Nara No 749 758 9 Yes 
Junnin  Nara No 758 764 6 Yes 
Shōtoku Nara No 764 770 6 No 
Kōnin Nara No 770 781 11 Yes 
Kammu  Heian  No 781 806 25 No 
Heizei  Heian  No 806 809 3 Yes 
Saga  Heian  No 809 823 14 Yes 
Junna  Heian  No 823 833 10 Yes 
Nimmyō Heian  No 833 850 17 No 
Montoku  Heian  No 850 858 8 No 
Seiwa  Heian  No 858 876 18 Yes 
Yōzei Heian  No 876 884 8 Yes 
Kōkō Heian  No 884 887 3 No 
Uda  Heian  No 887 897 10 Yes 
Daigo  Heian  No 897 930 33 Yes 
Suzaku  Heian  No 930 946 16 Yes 
Murakami  Heian  No 946 967 21 No 
Reizei  Heian  No 967 969 2 Yes 
En'yū Heian  No 969 984 15 Yes 
Kazan  Heian  No 984 986 2 Yes 
Ichijō Heian  No 986 1011 25 Yes 
Sanjō Heian  No 1011 1016 5 Yes 
Go-Ichijō Heian  No 1016 1036 20 No 
Go-Suzaku  Heian  No 1036 1045 9 Yes 
Go-Reizei  Heian  No 1045 1068 23 No 
Go-Sanjō Heian  No 1068 1073 5 Yes 
Shirakawa  Heian  No 1073 1129 56 No 
Toba  Heian  No 1107 1156 49 No 
Go-Shirakawa  Heian  No 1155 1192 37 No 
Takakura  Heian  No 1180 1181 1 No 
Antoku  Heian  No 1180 1185 5 No 
Go-Toba  Kamakura No 1183 1203 20 No 
Hojo Tokimasa Hojo No 1203 1205 2 Yes 
Yoshitoki Hojo No 1205 1224 19 No 
Yasutoki Hojo No 1224 1242 18 No 
Tsunetoki Hojo No 1242 1246 4 No 
Tokiyori Hojo No 1246 1256 10 Yes 
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Nagatoki Hojo No 1256 1264 8 No 
Masamura Hojo No 1264 1268 4 Yes 
Tokimune Hojo No 1268 1284 16 No 
Sadatoki Hojo No 1284 1301 17 Yes 
Morotoki Hojo No 1301 1311 10 No 
Munenobu Hojo No 1311 1312 1 No 
Hirotoki Hojo No 1312 1315 3 No 
Mototoki Hojo No 1315 1315 0 Yes 
Takatoki Hojo No 1316 1326 10 Yes 
Sadaaki Hojo No 1326 1326 0 Yes 
Moritoki Hojo No 1327 1333 6 Yes 
Ashikaga Takauji Ashikaga Yes 1338 1356 18 No 
Yoshiakira Ashikaga Yes 1359 1367 8 No 
Yoshimitsu Ashikaga Yes 1369 1395 26 Yes 
Yoshimochi Ashikaga Yes 1395 1423 28 Yes 
Yoshikazu Ashikaga Yes 1423 1425 2 No 
Yoshinori Ashikaga Yes 1429 1441 12 No 
Yoshikatsu Ashikaga Yes 1442 1443 1 No 
Hosimasa Ashikaga Yes 1449 1474 25 Yes 
Yoshihisa Ashikaga Yes 1474 1489 15 No 
Yoshitane Ashikaga Yes 1490 1493 3 Yes 
Yoshizumi Ashikaga Yes 1495 1508 13 Yes 
Yoshitane Ashikaga Yes 1508 1522 14 Yes 
Yoshiharu Ashikaga Yes 1522 1547 25 Yes 
Yoshiteru Ashikaga Yes 1547 1568 21 No 
Yoshihde Ashikaga Yes 1568 1568 0 No 
Yoshiakira Ashikaga Yes 1568 1573 5 Yes 
Tokugawa Leyasu Tokugawa Yes 1603 1605 2 Yes 
Hidetada Tokugawa Yes 1605 1623 18 Yes 
Lemitsu Tokugawa Yes 1623 1651 28 No 
Letsuna Tokugawa Yes 1651 1680 29 No 
Tsunayoshi Tokugawa Yes 1680 1709 29 No 
Lenobu Tokugawa Yes 1709 1712 3 No 
Letsugu Tokugawa Yes 1713 1716 3 No 
Yoshimune Tokugawa Yes 1716 1745 29 Yes 
Leshige Tokugawa Yes 1745 1760 15 Yes 
Leharu Tokugawa Yes 1760 1786 26 No 
Lenari Tokugawa Yes 1787 1837 50 Yes 
Leyoshi Tokugawa Yes 1837 1853 16 No 
lesada Tokugawa Yes 1853 1858 5 No 
lemochi Tokugawa Yes 1858 1866 8 No 
Yoshinobu Tokugawa Yes 1867 1868 1 Yes 
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